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When Do The Ends Justify The Means?:
The Role of The Necessary And Proper
Clause In The Commerce Clause Analysis
David Loudon
10 U. MASS. L. REV. 294
ABSTRACT
This Article discusses the interplay between the Necessary and Proper Clause and
the Commerce Clause, particularly in light of the landmark decision of National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. First, this Article reviews the
historical interaction between the two clauses, discussing the instances in which the
two may have been considered together, and introducing the Supreme Court
jurisprudence of each clause, setting the legal landscape for the NFIB v. Sebelius
decision. Next, this Article details the three opinions from the NFIB v. Sebelius
decision, Chief Justice Roberts’ holding, the joint concurrence, and Justice
Ginsberg’s dissent, specifically as they relate to the interaction between the
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper clause. This Article continues by
exploring the different theories of constitutional interpretation reflected in the three
NFIB v. Sebelius opinions. Finally, this Article concludes by proposing a “MeansEnds Framework” to govern the relationship between the two clauses. This
framework proposes that a federal regulation of intrastate activity is only permissible
when it serves as a means to an effective regulation of interstate commerce, and not
as additional end that is outside of Congress’s enumerated powers.
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I. INTRODUCTION

S

uppose that Congress decides tomorrow that more needs to be
done to deal with the problem of childhood obesity.1 As part of a
comprehensive plan to deal with the growing epidemic, Congress
passes the “Child Food and Health Safety Act.”2 The Act provides,
among other provisions, that children under the age of eighteen may
not “buy, possess, or consume” any soft drink larger than sixteen
ounces. Coca-Cola Inc., threatened with a decrease in profits,
challenges this provision,3 arguing that it is outside Congress’s
enumerated powers.4 Would this act be a constitutional exercise of
Congress’s legislative authority?
The government would likely support this statute under Congress’s
authority “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several states.”5 The
federal government, since the ratification of the Constitution, has been
universally acknowledged to be one of limited and enumerated
powers.6 In contrast to the states, which have a general police power,7

1

2

3

4

5

6

See generally Sabrina Tavernise, Obesity in Young Is Seen as Falling in Several
Cities, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/health
/childhood-obesity-drops-in-new-york-and-philadelphia.html.
This is a fictitious act created for hypothetical purposes inspired by New York
City’s ban on restaurants selling any soft drinks larger than sixteen ounces. See
Michael M. Grynbaum, New York Plans to Ban Sale of Big Sizes of Sugary
Drinks, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31
/nyregion/bloomberg-plans-a-ban-on-large-sugared-drinks.html.
Assume for the sake of this hypothetical that Coca-Cola has standing to
challenge the provision.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (giving Congress “all legislative Powers herein
granted”) (emphasis added); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (listing the
legislative powers granted to Congress); U.S. CONST. amend. X. (“The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This clause of the Constitution is commonly
referred to as the “Commerce Clause.”
See note 4 and provisions cited therein; see e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. 316, 405 (1819) (“This government is acknowledged by all, to be one of
enumerated powers.”); NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) (opinion
of Roberts, J.) (“In our federal system, the National Government possesses only
limited powers . . . the Constitution lists, or enumerates, the Federal
Government’s powers.”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995)
(“[t]he Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.”).
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the federal government only has the powers explicitly granted to it in
the Constitution.8 During the New Deal era, the Court expansively
interpreted Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, giving
Congress broad leeway in using its powers.9 However, in the last
twenty years, the Court has moved toward a more limited view of
Congress’s commerce power.10 Would the “Child Food Health and
Safety Act” survive constitutional scrutiny under this narrower view?
To begin, the Court would likely apply the traditional threecategory Commerce Clause framework that is has recited regularly in
its Commerce Clause cases.11 However, that would not be the end of
the analysis. The Court’s recent decision in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius (hereinafter “NFIB v. Sebelius”)
suggests that the Court would also conduct a separate inquiry into
whether Congress has the power to enact the regulation under the
“Necessary and Proper Clause,” which gives Congress the power to
“make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution” its enumerated powers.12 After practically ignoring this
clause throughout the development of its Commerce Clause
7

8
9

10

11

12

Although not always easy to define, generally the state “police power” has been
recognized to include regulations for the public health, safety, morals, and
welfare of its citizens. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 129 (1890) (“there seems
to be no doubt that [the police power] does extend to the protection of the lives,
health, and property of the citizens, and to the preservation of good order and the
public morals.”). But see generally Santiago Legarre, The Historical
Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745 (2007) (describing
the Court’s use of narrow and broad definitions of the term “police power”
throughout its jurisprudence). For practical purposes, this means that state
governments may pass any law that it deems to be in the best interests of its
citizens unless that law conflicts with an express prohibition in the Constitution.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2578.
See note 6 and cases cited therein.
See infra Part II.B.1 (describing the expansion of Congress’s commerce power
during the New Deal).
See infra Part II.B.2 (describing the Court’s attempts to limit Congress’s
authority under the Commerce Clause).
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16 (2005) (identifying the “three general
categories of regulation in which Congress is authorized to engage under its
commerce power” as (1) regulating the channels of interstate commerce; (2)
regulating the instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and (3) regulating
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. This clause is commonly referred to as the
“Necessary and Proper Clause.”
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jurisprudence, the Court in NFIB v. Sebelius put the clause into the
equation.13
The apparent emergence of the Necessary and Proper Clause as an
independent justification for federal economic regulations raises
important questions about the scope of federal power. What role
should the Necessary and Proper Clause play in the Court’s analysis in
future Commerce Clause cases?14 Will the clause be used to extend
federal power15 or to re-assert its limits?16 Is it implicitly included in
the current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, or is it an additional
extension of federal power?17 If it is an additional extension, what does
it add to the analysis?18
This Article argues that the views of the justices in NFIB v.
Sebelius fail to provide an adequate framework for applying the
Necessary and Proper Clause in relation to the Commerce Clause.
Instead, the Court should focus on ensuring that the Necessary and
Proper Clause provides “means” to regulate interstate commerce,
rather than an additional enumerated power.19 The Necessary and
Proper Clause gives Congress the authority to regulate intrastate
activities only when the regulation is used as a “means” to regulate

13

14

15

16

17
18
19

All three opinions specifically addressed the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Furthermore, both Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion and Justice Ginsburg’s
opinion analyzed the regulation separately under both the Commerce Clause and
the Necessary and Proper Clause. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591-93
(2012) (opinion of Roberts, J.); id. at 2646-47 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito,
JJ., concurring in part); id. at 2625-26 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part); see infra
Part III. This is in contrast to the Court’s prior Commerce Clause cases, in which
the Court either omitted the Necessary and Proper Clause entirely, or mentioned
it only briefly. See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part V (proposing the “Means-Ends Framework” for the relationship
between the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Commerce Clause).
See infra Part IV.A (discussing the “expansive approach” to Congress’s
commerce power).
See infra Part IV.B (discussing the “limiting approaches” to Congress’s
commerce power).
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 584 (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause
“should . . . be understood to regulate the relationship between congressional
means and constitutional ends”).
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interstate commerce.20 In order to ensure that intrastate regulations
serve only as a means and not an end, the Court should hold that an
intrastate regulation is necessary and proper only if the regulation is
substantially related to a larger economic scheme that predominates
over the individual regulation.21 This view of the interaction between
the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses is consistent with
the language of the Necessary and Proper Clause and strikes the proper
balance, by giving Congress flexibility to fix the means of enforcing
its commerce power, while denying it the police power reserved to the
states.
Part II discusses the history of the Commerce and Necessary and
Proper Clauses and how the Court has treated the interaction between
the two. Part III examines the different opinions from NFIB v.
Sebelius, applying the Necessary and Proper Clause to the individual
mandate. Part IV examines the Court’s competing theories from NFIB
v. Sebelius on the relationship between the Commerce Clause and
Necessary and Proper Clause. Finally, Part V proposes a “Means-Ends
Framework” for the relationship between the Necessary and Proper
Clause and the Commerce Clause, and discusses how this framework
could be applied in future cases.
II. CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Both the Court’s Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence and
Commerce Clause jurisprudence have created a broad, although
limited, scope of federal power.22 However, the Court has rarely
addressed the relationship between the two clauses, creating
uncertainty about the true extent of federal power.23 Nevertheless, two
common themes emerge from the case law: (1) the Justices are split in
their opinion as to whether a “rational relationship” between a
20

21

22

23

See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); see infra
Part V.
See infra Part V.A (describing in more detail the three-part test proposed in this
article).
See infra Part II.A (describing the significant leeway the Court has provided
Congress under the Necessary and Proper Clause to choose the means to enforce
its enumerated powers); see infra Part II.B (describing the broad authority the
Court has provided Congress under the Commerce Clause to regulate economic
or commercial activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
See infra Part II.B.
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regulation and an enumerated power is sufficient to survive
constitutional scrutiny24 and (2) intrastate regulations have only been
upheld when they are part of a larger statutory scheme that regulates
interstate commerce.25
A. The Necessary and Proper Clause
The Necessary and Proper Clause applies not only to Congress’s
commerce power, but to all of its enumerated powers.26 The Court’s
application of the Necessary and Proper Clause in other contexts will
help guide the Court in defining its relationship to the Commerce
Clause. Any analysis of the role of the Necessary and Proper Clause in
the United States’ constitutional jurisprudence must start with an
examination of Chief Justice Marshall’s landmark opinion in
McCulloch v. Maryland.27 In McCulloch, the Court addressed the
much-debated constitutional issue of whether the federal government
had the power to incorporate a bank.28 The creation and chartering of a
bank is not explicitly mentioned among Congress’s enumerated
powers, so the only way that Congress could exercise that authority
would be if the act of creating and chartering a bank was implied from
its power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.29 Ultimately, the
Court upheld the incorporation of the national bank as necessary and
proper to the execution of Congress’s enumerated powers.30
The Court rejected Maryland’s argument that the Necessary and
Proper Clause is not an expansive clause, but a limiting one, restricting
Congress’s power to pass only those laws that are absolutely necessary
24
25
26

27
28

29

30

See text accompanying notes 45-57, 112, 114-16, 151-54.
See text accompanying notes 65, 101, 129-32, 148-49.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (giving Congress the authority to “make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” its enumerated
powers).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
Id. at 401 (“[H]as congress power to incorporate a bank?”); see also Keith
Werhan, Checking Congress and Balancing Federalism: A Lesson from
Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 57 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1213, 1228
(2000) (describing the controversy over whether the incorporation of a bank was
within Congress’s authority as a “longstanding controversy”).
Werhan, supra note 28, at 1228 (noting that “the framers had not explicitly
included [the power to incorporate a bank] in the Article I, Section 8 delineation
of congressional authority”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 424.
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for the execution of its enumerated powers.31 According to the Court,
the Constitution gives Congress “great powers” to execute, and “[i]t
can never be [the Framers’] interest, and cannot be presumed to have
been their intention, to clog and embarrass [their] execution, by
withholding the most appropriate means.”32 As such, the Court defined
the word “necessary” as something “convenient or useful,” rather than
something “absolutely necessary.”33 Therefore, because the
incorporation of a national bank was “convenient” and “useful” toward
the execution of Congress’s enumerated powers,34 it was constitutional
under the Necessary and Proper Clause.35
McCulloch stands for the general proposition that the Necessary
and Proper Clause provides Congress with significant leeway to
choose the means to enforce its enumerated powers, even means that
are not “absolutely necessary” for their enactment.36 However, Chief
Justice Marshall did not address head-on the tension between his
observation that “[t]his government is acknowledged by all, to be one
31
32

33

34

35
36

Id. at 412-13.
Id. at 407-08. The Court later added that a restrictive interpretation of the
Necessary and Proper Clause would severely restrict the powers of the national
government and therefore be “pernicious in its operation.” Id. at 416.
Id. at 413. In addition to its argument that a narrow interpretation of the
Necessary and Proper Clause would undermine Congress’s ability to govern the
nation, the Court also put forward numerous textual arguments to support its
broad interpretation. First, the Court noted that the phrase “absolutely
necessary” appears in another provision of the Constitution. Id. at 414. The fact
that the framers chose not to use that language in Article I Section 8 suggests
that they did not intend a narrow interpretation of Congressional authority. Id.
The Court further argued that the inclusion of the word “proper” with
“necessary” indicated that the framers meant to “to qualify [a] strict and
rigorous” interpretation of the clause. Id. at 418-419. Finally, the Court noted
that the Necessary and Proper Clause was located in the Constitution among
Congress’s powers, further indicating that the Necessary and Proper Clause was
intended to expand federal authority, not limit it. Id. at 419.
Id. at 422 (“That [a national bank] is a convenient, a useful, and essential
instrument in the prosecution of [the federal government’s] fiscal operations, is
not now a subject of controversy.”).
Id. at 424.
Werhan, supra note 28, at 1226-28 (arguing that Chief Justice Marshall’s
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause was broad); see Beck, supra
note 19, at 601 (arguing that in McCulloch, “Marshall emphasized the federal
government’s need for ample means to accomplish its delegated objects.”); see
also text accompanying notes 31-35.
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of enumerated powers”37 and his belief that Congress has discretion to
choose the proper means.38 Perhaps the closest Chief Justice Marshall
comes to addressing the outer limits of the necessary and proper power
is with his famous quote, “[l]et the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.”39 This framework, while a good starting point, leaves
significant questions to be answered by future cases. What makes a
particular means “appropriate” for Congress to promulgate? How tight
of a fit is required between the means and the enumerated power to
make it “plainly adapted?” What means are prohibited by the “spirit of
the constitution?” Ultimately, McCulloch left the Court with two
competing propositions, that the power of the federal government is
clearly circumscribed to those listed in the Constitution, and that
Congress has wide flexibility to choose the means to enforce those
powers.40
Nearly 200 years after McCulloch, the Court is still struggling to
reconcile these competing propositions. In the 2010 case, United
States v. Comstock,41 the issue was whether the federal government
had the authority to involuntarily detain sexually dangerous federal
prisoners after those prisoners have completed their sentences.42 The
Justices essentially conceded that the detainment was not directly
related to an enumerated power,43 but nevertheless upheld the
37
38

39
40
41
42
43

McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405.
Chief Justice Marshall hints at the potential conflict when he states that “[i]t
is . . . the subject of fair inquiry, how far such means may be employed,” but he
does not answer this question in his opinion. Id. at 409.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 405, 413.
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010).
Id. at 129-30.
While not explicitly stated, the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions
were all based on the idea that there was not a direct link between the authority
and an enumerated power. See id. at 146 (“[T]he links between [the statute] and
an enumerated Article I power are not too attenuated.”); id. at 150 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“Respondents argue that congressional authority
under the Necessary and Proper Clause can be no more than one step removed
from an enumerated power. This is incorrect . . . the analysis depends not on the
number of links in the congressional-power chain but on the strength of the
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regulation by a 7-2 vote.44 The five-Justice majority emphasized the
broad power that Congress possesses under the Necessary and Proper
Clause,45 articulating the standard as whether “the statute constitutes a
means that is rationally related to the implementation of a
constitutionally enumerated power.”46 Since the link “between [the
statute] and an enumerated Article I power was not too attenuated,” the
Court held that the statute was within Congress’s authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause.47 Thus, the majority applied a rationalbasis standard and found the regulation constitutional.48
Justices Alito and Kennedy concurred in the judgment, but rejected
the majority’s use of rational-basis review.49 Both concurring opinions
expressed concern with the “breadth of the [majority’s] language” in
its opinion.50 Justice Kennedy criticized the majority’s use of rationalbasis review when analyzing Congress’s powers under the Necessary
and Proper Clause,51 arguing that this standard is inappropriate in a
case that involves “powers . . . confined by the principles that control

44
45

46
47

48
49

50

51

chain.”); id. at 159 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Necessary and Proper
Clause empowers Congress to enact only those laws that ‘carr[y] into
Execution’ one or more of the federal powers enumerated in the Constitution.
Because [the statute] ‘execut[es]’ no enumerated power, I must respectfully
dissent.”) (citation omitted); see also Ilya Somin, Taking Stock of Comstock:
The Necessary and Proper Clause and the Limits of Federal Power 2010 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 239, 249 (noting that the majority opinion in Comstock does not
show a direct connection between the statute and an enumerated power).
Comstock, 560 U.S. at 128.
Id. at 133. Justice Breyer wrote the opinion of the Court, which was joined by
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Chief Justice Roberts. Id. at 128.
Id. at 134 (emphasis added).
Id. at 146. The Court also stated three other main reasons for finding that the
statute was within Congress’s authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The Court noted that the government’s extension of power in this case: (1) was a
“modest” extension to one it already exercised; (2) was “reasonable;” and (3)
properly accounted for state interests. Id. at 137, 142-43.
Id. at 134, 146.
Id. at 150 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 155 (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 155 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 154 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that “[T]he [majority opinion] ignores
important limitations stemming from federalism principles.”).
Id. at 151-52 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Somin, supra note 43,
at 245 (noting that in Comstock “Kennedy argued against the use of the ‘rational
basis’ test adopted by the majority”).
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the limited nature of our National Government.”52 Similarly, Justice
Alito implicitly attacked the majority’s use of rational-basis review.53
In support of his position that the statute in question was
constitutional, Justice Alito argued that “[t]his is not a case in which it
is merely possible for a court to think of a rational basis on which
Congress might have perceived an attenuated link between” the means
and an enumerated power.54 While Justices Kennedy and Alito joined
the majority’s judgment, they both expressed concerns about the
majority’s use of a lenient rational-basis review.55
Comstock did not involve the Commerce Clause, so it is unclear if
its holding would affect the traditional Commerce Clause analysis.
Even if the exact analysis employed by the Justices in Comstock would
not be relevant to a Commerce Clause case, the case offers a key
insight into their views on the Necessary and Proper Clause
generally.56 Despite the majority’s application of a lenient rationalbasis review for statutes supported by the Necessary and Proper
Clause, the Court was divided as to whether a more stringent review
should be required.57 Thus, the Court is currently divided as to how
strong of a connection is required between the means and an
52

53
54

55

56
57

Comstock, 560 U.S. at 151 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Kennedy proposed instead that the Court should apply a heightened rationalbasis review that requires a “demonstrated link in fact, based upon empirical
demonstration” in order to support a law under the Necessary and Proper
Clause. Id. at 152.
Id. at 155-58 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 158. Justice Alito wrote on the topic of the Necessary and Proper Clause in
general that “[a]lthough the term ‘necessary’ does not mean ‘absolutely
necessary’ or indispensable, the term requires an ‘appropriate’ link between a
power conferred by the Constitution and the law enacted by Congress.” Id. This
also suggests that Justice Alito supports the idea that a standard more stringent
than rational-basis is required in necessary and proper cases.
Id. (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 151-52 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment).
See text accompanying note 57-58.
While Justices Scalia and Thomas did not attack the rational-basis standard
directly in their dissent, both attacked it in a prior case relating to the Commerce
Clause. See e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 36 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment); id. at 61 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Furthermore, while Chief
Justice Roberts signed on to the opinion in full, indicating that he also supported
the majority’s rational-basis review, Comstock, 560 U.S. at 128, his subsequent
opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius suggests that Roberts may not be completely
supportive of the majority’s lenient standard of review. See infra Part III.A.
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enumerated end to justify a regulation under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.58
B. The Commerce Clause
The Necessary and Proper Clause has played an important, if often
unexamined, role in the Court’s expansion of Congress’s commerce
power.59 Over time, the Court has developed a three-category
framework for analyzing Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause.60 A regulation is constitutional under the Commerce Clause if
it regulates, (1) the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or (3) economic or
commercial intrastate activities that, in the aggregate, have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.61 The influence of the
Necessary and Proper Clause on the Court’s Commerce Clause
jurisprudence becomes apparent when the Court started to uphold
regulations of purely intrastate activities that had a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.62 However, while the Court at times used the
language associated with the Necessary and Proper Clause, or briefly
mentioned that the clause was relevant, there was no extended
discussion on the precise role that the clause played until Justice
Scalia’s concurrence in Gonzales v. Raich.63 As such, it is unclear
whether the Necessary and Proper Clause is already incorporated in
the traditional Commerce Clause analysis, or whether it constitutes an
independent justification for Congressional regulation of economic
activities.
1. The Expansion of the Commerce Power
The Court’s first clear indication that the Necessary and Proper
Clause affected the Court’s analysis in a Commerce Clause case came

58
59
60

61
62
63

See text accompanying notes 46-57.
See infra Part II.B.1-2.
See Raich, 545 U.S. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that
“[s]ince. . . [1971], our cases have mechanically recited that the Commerce
Clause permits congressional regulation of three categories”).
Id.; see infra Part II.B.1-2.
See infra Part II.B.1.
See infra Part II.B.1-3.
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in the 1941 case, United States v. Darby.64 The issue in Darby was
whether Congress, as part of a “comprehensive legislative scheme,”65
had the power to prohibit the shipment in interstate commerce of
goods manufactured by workers whose employers did not comply with
the maximum hours and minimum wage laws prescribed by
Congress.66 The Court first held that the regulation was constitutional
because it regulated an item that moved through interstate commerce.67
The Court went on to hold that Congress’s regulation on
manufacturing would be constitutional even without the requirement
that the goods enter interstate commerce.68
The Court, using the language from McCulloch, held that
Congress’s commerce power included purely intrastate activities that
affect interstate commerce.69 The Court held that Congress’s authority
“extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate
commerce. . . as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the
attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce.”70 The Court used similar
language when it held that Congress “may choose the means
reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted end, even
64

65

66
67

68

69
70

United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Beck, supra note 19, at 617-19
(arguing that the Court relied on McCulloch and the Necessary and Proper
Clause in upholding the statute in Darby).
Darby, 312 U.S. at 109. While the Court in Darby did not mention this as a
factor in its decision, this distinction becomes crucial in future commerce clause
cases, in which the Court held regulations unconstitutional in part because they
were not part of a larger economic scheme. See e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 562 (1995); see infra Part II.B.2.
Darby, 312 U.S. at 105.
The Court reasoned that “[T]he power of Congress under the Commerce Clause
is plenary to exclude any article from interstate commerce subject only to the
specific prohibitions of the Constitution.” Id. at 116.
Id. at 122. This holding is arguably dictum since the Court had already held that
the act was constitutional because it regulated items that went through interstate
commerce. Id. at 116. Nevertheless, this holding was highly influential and
followed by subsequent Court decisions. See infra Part II.B.1 (describing the
Wickard Court’s adoption of this holding from Darby).
See text accompanying notes 70-72.
Darby, 312 U.S. at 118 (emphasis added). Compare Darby, 312 U.S. at 118,
with McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 408 (writing that “[i]t can never be [the Framers’s]
interest, and cannot be presumed to have been their intention, to clog and
embarrass its execution, by withholding the most appropriate means” to
effectuate Congress’s enumerated powers) (emphasis added).
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though they involve control of intrastate activities”71 and that “[t]he
means adopted by [the act] . . . is so related to the commerce and so
affects it as to be within the reach of the commerce power.”72 Thus,
the Court held that Congress may regulate purely intrastate activities
as a “means” to enforce its commerce power.73 Despite the Court’s use
of Necessary and Proper Clause language, it did not once mention the
clause in its analysis, instead relying solely on the Commerce Clause
in reaching its decision.74 Nevertheless, it is clear that the principles of
the clause, as enunciated in McCulloch, buttressed the Court’s
expansion of the Commerce Clause to include purely intrastate
activities.75
In Wickard v. Filburn,76 a case that “has long been regarded as
‘perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause
Authority of intrastate activity,’”77 the Court completed its expansion
of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. In Wickard, the
Court held that the federal government could limit the amount of
wheat that a farmer produced even if the wheat never entered interstate
commerce.78 The Court began its analysis in Wickard by affirming the
principle enunciated in Darby, that Congress’s commerce power
includes the ability to regulate intrastate activities that have a

71

72
73
74

75

76
77

78

Darby, 312 U.S. at 121 (emphasis added). Compare Darby, 312 U.S. at 121,
with McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421 (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”) (emphasis added).
Darby, 312 U.S. at 123.
See text accompanying notes 70-72.
Darby, 312 U.S at 123 (“The means adopted by [the act] . . . are so related to the
commerce and so affects it as to be within the reach of the commerce power.”).
See text accompanying notes 70-72; see also Beck, supra note 19, at 617-19
(arguing that the Court relied on McCulloch and the Necessary and Proper
Clause in upholding the statute in Darby).
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2588 (2012) (quoting United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995)).
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 113-17. The Court addresses the issue squarely when it
acknowledged that “the [issue] would merit little consideration . . . except for
the fact that this Act extends federal regulation to production not intended in any
part for commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm.” Id. at 118.
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substantial effect on interstate commerce.79 The Court rejected the use
of “mechanical applications of legal formulas,” that prohibited
regulations with “indirect” effects or that involved only
“production.”80 Instead, it held that Congress had the authority under
the Commerce Clause to regulate any activity that had a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.81
The Court then took the analysis one step further, concluding that
when determining whether an activity has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce, the activity must be viewed in the aggregate, not
on the effect of one occurrence.82 Although Mr. Filburn’s activities
alone may not substantially affect the interstate market for wheat, “his
contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly
situated, is far from trivial.”83 The Court reasoned that the farmer’s
production of his own wheat, combined with the potential production
of others, substantially affects interstate commerce.84 As a result, the
Court held that Congress may, under the Commerce Clause, regulate
the farmer’s wheat production, regardless of whether that wheat
actually entered interstate commerce.85
In sum, the Wickard Court concluded that Congress could regulate
any intrastate activity that, considered in the aggregate, had a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.86 This formulation of
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause pushed the line toward

79

80

81

82
83

84
85
86

Id. at 124, (concluding that Congress’s commerce power “extends to those
intrastate activities which in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct the
exercise of” interstate commerce); see text accompanying notes 68-69.
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124. The Court further reasoned that “‘commerce among
the states is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the
course of business.’” Id. at 122 (quoting Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S.
375, 398 (1905)).
Id. at 124-25 (“[E]ven if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress
if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.”) (emphasis
added).
Id. at 128.
Id. Growing wheat at home would allow farmers to forgo purchasing wheat
from the market, decreasing the amount of wheat sold in commerce. Id.
Id.
Id. at 127-29.
See text accompanying notes 79-81.
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the creation of a national police power.87 Ironically, the Court created
such a broad formulation without reference to the Necessary and
Proper Clause. The Court only mentions the Necessary and Proper
Clause once in the entire opinion, in the context of stating one of the
government’s arguments supporting the constitutionality of the
regulation.88 Furthermore, unlike the Court in Darby,89 the Court in
Wickard did not use the language of “necessary and proper” in its
decision, but instead relied solely on the Commerce Clause and its
own precedent.90 Thus, it is unclear what role, if any, the Necessary
and Proper Clause played in the Court’s decision.
2. The Backlash
For the next five decades, the Court consistently used this broad
formulation of federal power from Wickard to uphold regulations
under the Commerce Clause.91 However, the Court “shocked the legal
community”92 with its 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez93 and
87

88

89

90
91

92
93

See e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional
Gestal, 91 WASH. U.L. REV. 1, 3 & n.9 (2013) (citing numerous law review
articles that characterized that Court’s commerce clause authority after Wickard
as unlimited); Kathleen A. Burdette, Making Parents Pay: Interstate Child
Support Enforcement After United States v. Lopez, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1469,
1477 (1996) (“Since the New Deal, Congress has had virtually unlimited power
to regulate under the Commerce Clause.”); Arthur B. Mark, III, Currents in
Commerce Clause Scholarship Since Lopez: A Survey, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 671,
679-80 (2004) (“In Wickard, the Court approved Congress’s use of a virtually
unlimited power under the Commerce Clause over intrastate activity.”).
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 119 (“[T]he Government argues that the statute . . . is
sustainable as a ‘necessary and proper’ implementation of the power of
Congress over interstate commerce.”). Despite mentioning the argument in the
opinion, the Court never directly responds to it.
See text accompanying notes 70-72 (describing the Darby Court’s use of the
Necessary and Proper Clause language from McCulloch in affirming a
congressional regulation of intrastate manufacturing).
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 122-30.
See e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Katzenbaugh v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S.
146 (1971); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation, 452 U.S. 264 (1981);
see also A. Christopher Bryant, The Third Death of Federalism, 17 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 138 (2007) (noting that “[b]etween 1936 and 1995, the
Court upheld every federal statute regulating private conduct challenged as
beyond Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause”).
Bryant, supra note 91, at 138; Beck, supra note 19, at 615.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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2000 decision in United States v. Morrison.94 In these landmark cases,
the Court attempted to place limitations on Congress’s commerce
power that were consistent with precedent.95 Specifically, the Court
limited the intrastate activities Congress could regulate to economic
activities, rejected an “attenuated” relationship between an intrastate
activity and interstate commerce, and suggested that intrastate
regulations were only permissible if part of a larger statutory scheme.96
In Lopez, the Court held that a federal statute banning the
possession of a gun in a school zone was unconstitutional.97 After
recognizing that the Court’s jurisprudence since Darby greatly
expanded federal power,98 the Court began to narrow that power
without completely disregarding the framework that the Court had
established.99 The Court differentiated the current case from the
Court’s precedent, reasoning that the regulation “is a criminal statute
that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of
economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those
terms.”100 Similarly, unlike the regulations the Court had previously
upheld, this regulation “is not an essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut
unless the intrastate activity were regulated.”101 Therefore, the Court
differentiated this case from precedent because the activity regulated
was not economic, and the statute was not part of a larger regulatory
scheme.102

94
95
96

97
98
99

100

101
102

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Bryant, supra note 91, at 139.
See generally Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (imposing
limitations on Congress’s authority to regulate intrastate activities under the
Commerce Clause).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
Id. at 555-56.
Id. at 558-59. The Court noted that “even . . . modern-era precedents which have
expanded congressional power under the Commerce Clause confirm that this
power is subject to outer limits.” Id. at 556-57.
Id. at 561. The Court also noted that “Even Wickard, which is perhaps the most
far reaching example of Commerce Clause Authority over intrastate activity,
involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a school
zone does not.” Id. at 560.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 560-62.
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Next, the Court in Lopez considered the connection between
possessing a gun in a school zone and interstate commerce.103 The
Court did not address whether Congress had a rational basis for
finding that possession of a gun in a school zone would affect
interstate commerce.104 Instead, the Court reasoned that the
government’s argument—that guns around schools leads to crime,
which ultimately affects interstate commerce—would, in effect, give
Congress a police power.105 To accept the Government’s arguments of
an effect on interstate commerce, the Court would have to “pile
inference upon inference” in a way that would allow Congress to
regulate any activity.106 Thus, the Court implicitly rejected a lenient
rational-basis review and held that the connection between the
regulation and interstate commerce was too remote to support the
regulation under the Commerce Clause.107
Five years later in United States v. Morrison, the Court showed
that the Lopez restrictions on Congress’s Commerce Clause authority
were here to stay.108 Morrison involved a federal statute that provided
“a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence.”109
Relying heavily on its reasoning from Lopez, the Court declared the
law unconstitutional.110 In particular, the Court focused on the noneconomic nature of the activity being regulated111 and the attenuated
103

104
105

106
107
108

109
110

111

Id. at 564 (“We pause to consider the implications of the Government’s
arguments.”).
See id. at 564-66.
Id. at 567 (arguing that the government’s theory would “convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power”); see also id. at
564 (“[I]f we were to accept the Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed
to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to
regulate.”).
Id. at 567; see note 105.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
Bryant, supra note 91, at 145 (arguing that “the [Morrison decision] indicated
that Lopez was not merely a solitary signal of the Court’s displeasure with
Congress’s inattention to the limits on its own authority”).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601.
Id. at 602. “Since Lopez most recently canvassed and clarified our case law
governing this third category of Commerce Clause regulation, it provides the
proper framework for conducting the required analysis of § 13981 [of the
Violence Against Women Act].” Id. at 609.
Id. at 613 (“Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the
phrase, economic activity.”).
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nature of the connection between gender-motivated violence and
interstate commerce.112 Thus, the Court in Morrison reinforced the
limitations on Congress’s Commerce Clause authority enunciated in
Lopez, and held that the statute was unconstitutional.113
While the actual impact of Lopez and Morrison on subsequent
lower court decisions has been arguably inconsistent,114 the Court was
clearly attempting to limit any further expansion of congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause. The Court limited the intrastate
activities that Congress may regulate to economic or commercial
activities.115 Additionally, the Court in both cases implicitly rejected
rational-basis review and suggested that an attenuated connection
between the regulation and interstate commerce was insufficient to
support a regulation under the Commerce Clause.116 In neither case did
the Court use the text of the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and
Proper Clause to support these restrictions,117 but instead used a
limiting reading of precedent118 and emphasized fears of creating a
112

113
114

115

116
117

118

Id. at 615 (arguing that the link between gender-motivated violence and
interstate commerce was so attenuated that allowing a regulation based on such
a tenuous link would “obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national
and local authority”).
Id. at 602.
Mark A. Correro, The Lopez/Morrison Limitation on the Commerce Clause Fact or Fabrication?, 14 DIGEST 17, 49 (2006) (“In some areas . . . the courts
have severely limited the reach of the federal government by relying on Lopez
and Morrison. In other areas . . . the courts have engaged in intellectual
corruption in order to square the statute with the Constitution.”).
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
559-60 (1995)). However, the Court does not specifically delineate which
activities are “commercial or economic.” Bryant, supra note 91, at 145-46. All
that we know for sure is that violence and gun possession are not economic
activities.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615; see text accompanying notes 103-07.
Neither of the majority opinions in Lopez or Morrison mentions the Necessary
and Proper Clause even once in their analyses. See Beck, supra note 19, at 584
(noting that the Court did not mention the Necessary and Proper Clause in either
Lopez or Morrison and arguing that it should have).
Prior to Lopez, the Court had not explicitly distinguished between economic and
noneconomic local activities and indicated that any activity that had a
substantial effect on interstate commerce was within Congress’s commerce
authority. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1942) (“[E]ven if
appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it
may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
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national police power.119 The question still remained as to what role, if
any, the Necessary and Proper Clause played in this analysis.
3. Gonzales v. Raich and The Scalia Framework
In its last significant Commerce Clause case prior to NFIB v.
Sebelius, the Court reaffirmed much of its expansive Commerce
Clause precedent without denouncing the recent limitations enunciated
in Lopez and Morrison.120 In Gonzales v. Raich,121 the Court addressed
whether Congress has the authority to prohibit the local cultivation and
use of marijuana that did not enter interstate commerce122 as part of a
“comprehensive regime” to eliminate the interstate market in illicit
drugs.123 Relying heavily on Wickard, the Court held that the
regulation was constitutional.124
The Court began by reaffirming the notion that Congress may
regulate purely intrastate activities that have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.125 It then noted that, like the wheat produced for
personal consumption in Wickard, the growth of home-consumed
marijuana “affect[s] price and other market conditions” of marijuana
and therefore has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.126
Finally, the Court emphasized that the proper inquiry is not whether an
activity, if undertaken by all people similarly situated, actually has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, but only whether Congress

119

120
121
122
123
124
125
126

economic effect on interstate commerce.”); see text accompanying note 81.
Nevertheless, the Court in Lopez and Morrison noted that its prior cases all
involved economic activity, and that because possession and gender-related
violence were not economic activities, the statutes could not be upheld. United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560-61 (1995); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (arguing that the link between violence and interstate
commerce was so attenuated that allowing regulation based on such a tenuous
link would “obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and local
authority”).
See supra Part II.B.2.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
Id. at 5.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
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had a “‘rational basis’ . . . for so concluding.”127 Since Congress had a
rational basis for concluding that the defendant’s local cultivation and
use of marijuana, combined with others who would also cultivate and
use marijuana, would affect the interstate market for that product, the
regulation was within Congress’s powers under the Commerce and
Necessary and Proper clauses.128
The majority differentiated Raich from Lopez and Morrison in two
ways. First, the regulation challenged here was one part of a
“concededly valid statutory scheme” to restrict the interstate market
for illicit drugs, whereas the provisions challenged in Lopez and
Morrison were not enacted to achieve a larger economic objective.129
Because the larger regulatory scheme in Raich would be “undercut
unless the intrastate activity [was] regulated,” this regulation differed
significantly from those in Lopez and Morrison.130 Second, unlike the
activities in Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated here were
“the production, distribution and consumption of commodities,” which
the Court characterized as “quintessentially economic.”131 The Court
thus distinguished this case from Lopez and Morrison on the grounds
that the regulation was part of a legitimate comprehensive regulatory
scheme and regulated a “quintessentially economic” activity.132
Unlike the Court in Wickard, the majority in Raich explicitly
invoked the Necessary and Proper Clause in support of its decision.133
127

128
129
130
131
132
133

Id. at 22. The Court repeated this language many times throughout the opinion;
id. at 26 (“Prohibiting the intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of
commerce is a rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce
in that product.”) (emphasis added); id. at 28-29 (“[Congress’s conclusion that
homegrown marijuana will affect the market for marijuana] is not only rational,
but ‘visible to the naked eye’ under any commonsense appraisal of the probable
consequences of such an open-ended exemption.”) (emphasis added).
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24-25 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
Id. at 25, 26.
Id. at 24-25, 26.
Compare Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 119, with Raich, 545 U.S. at 5
(“The question presented in this case is whether the power vested in Congress
by Article I, § 8, of the Constitution ‘[t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution’ its authority to ‘regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States’ includes the
power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with
California law.”), and id. at 22 (“Congress was acting well within its authority to
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However, it failed to explain what role this clause played in the
analysis.134 The majority cited the Necessary and Proper Clause twice,
once in stating the issue before the Court and once in concluding that
the regulation was constitutional.135 While the majority’s inclusion of
the Necessary and Proper Clause in the opinion suggests that it is part
of the Commerce Clause framework, the majority’s failure to include
the Necessary and Proper Clause during its analysis leaves it unclear
as to what, specifically, the Necessary and Proper Clause adds to the
Commerce Clause framework.
However, Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, argued that the
Necessary and Proper Clause was already incorporated within the third
category of the established Commerce Clause framework.136 Justice
Scalia argued that Congress’s authority to regulate intrastate activities
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce derives not from
the Commerce Clause itself, but from the Necessary and Proper
Clause.137 Consistent with this framework, Justice Scalia argued that
the key issue when analyzing whether a regulation is necessary and
proper to Congress’s commerce power is whether the regulation is
“essential to a comprehensive regulation of interstate commerce.”138

134
135
136

137

138

‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper’ to ‘regulate Commerce . . .
among the several States.’”) (citation omitted).
See Raich, 545 U.S. at 24-25, 26.
See id.
Raich, 545 U.S. at 34-38 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). The third
category of the established Commerce Clause framework allows Congress to
regulate activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 34.
Id. (arguing that intrastate activities that have an effect on interstate commerce
“are not themselves part of interstate commerce, and thus the power to regulate
them cannot come from the Commerce Clause alone. Rather, [Congress’s power
to regulate these activities] derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause.”).
Id. at 37. It is unclear exactly how strong a relationship between the regulation
and the larger economic scheme Justice Scalia would require to justify a
regulation under the Necessary and Proper Clause, as he uses different language
throughout the opinion to describe this relationship, each suggesting a different
level of connection required. At various times throughout the opinion, Scalia
uses the terms “necessary,” “reasonably adapted” and “essential” when
describing the required relationship between the regulation and the regulatory
scheme. Id. at 37. What is clear is that Scalia supports the Court’s proposition
from Lopez that the Court will not “‘pile inference upon inference’” in order to
establish that noneconomic activity has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.” Id. at 36 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567
(1995)).

316

UMass Law Review

v. 10 | 294

Justice Scalia went a step further than the majority opinion,
challenging two of the key limitations on the commerce power
imposed in Lopez and Morrison.139 Justice Scalia argued that, so long
as a regulation is “reasonably adapted”140 to a legitimate regulatory
scheme of interstate commerce, the intrastate activity need not be
economic, nor need it, by itself, have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.141 Thus, Justice Scalia views the Necessary and Proper
Clause as authorizing Congress to regulate any intrastate activity,
whether economic or not, that is “necessary” to make a larger scheme
of interstate regulation effective.142
The majority opinion in Raich did not repudiate the Lopez and
Morrison restrictions, but instead differentiated this case from those
prior decisions.143 Perhaps ironically, only Justice Scalia’s concurrence
suggested a reversal of key parts of the Court’s decisions in Lopez and
Morrison.144 Justice Scalia, for the first time, explicitly stated what the
Court in Darby had implied,145 that the third category of acceptable
regulations under the Commerce Clause is derived from the Necessary
and Proper Clause.146
While no other Justice joined Justice Scalia’s concurrence,147 it is
nevertheless important because Scalia offers a potential framework
139
140
141

142
143
144

145
146
147

Id. at 35-37.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 35 (“Where necessary to make a regulation of interstate commerce
effective, Congress may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not
themselves substantially affect interstate commerce.”). Justice Scalia reiterates
this point multiple times in his concurrence. Id. at 36 (“[C]ongress’s authority to
enact laws necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce is not
limited to laws directed against economic activities that have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.); id. at 37 (“The regulation of an intrastate activity may
be essential to a comprehensive regulation of interstate commerce even though
the intrastate activity does not itself ‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce.”);
id. at 40 (“That simple possession is a noneconomic activity is immaterial to
whether it can be prohibited as a necessary part of a larger regulation.”).
See text accompanying notes 138-41.
See supra Part II.B.3.
See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) (arguing that an intrastate activity that Congress regulates need
not be economic or commercial in nature).
See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part II.B.1.
Raich, 545 U.S. at 4.

2015

When Do the Ends Justify the Means?

317

that the Court could adopt in analyzing the relationship between the
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Furthermore,
Justice Scalia’s emphasis on the requirement that a regulation of
intrastate commerce be part of a “larger economic scheme” is
supported by a majority of the Court148 and even finds recognition in
Lopez.149 Thus, there exists some common ground around which the
Court could form a unified theory of the relationship between the
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses.
However, as also seen in Raich, and five years later in Comstock,
the Court was divided as to how strong a connection there must be
between the activity regulated and its effects on interstate
commerce.150 While joining in the Court’s judgment, Justice Scalia
expressed support for the proposition from Lopez that the Court will
not “‘pile inference upon inference’” to find that an intrastate
regulation has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 151 This
assertion is in tension—if not in complete conflict—with the
majority’s repeated emphasis on a deferential rational-basis standard
for the connection required between the activity regulated and
interstate commerce.152 Furthermore, although Justice Kennedy joined
148

149

150
151

152

Id. at 22 (The five person majority opinion in Raich, which included Justice
Kennedy, who joined the majority opinions in Lopez and Morrison, emphasized
that the statute was part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme and wrote that
“[a]s we have done many times before, we refuse to excise individual
components of [a] larger [economic] scheme”); see also John T. Parry, “Society
Must be [Regulated]”: Biopolitics and the Commerce Clause in Gonzeles v.
Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 853, 853 (2005) (writing that “the only clear
doctrinal result of the [Raich] decision is that pieces of comprehensive
regulatory programs will be upheld precisely because they are part of a larger
program.”).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (noting that the statute
restricting possession of guns in a school zone was not “an essential part of a
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated” and that the statute cannot
be “sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of
or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate commerce”).
See text accompanying notes 55-58.
Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Lopez,
514 U.S. at 567); see also text accompanying note 138.
Id. at 22 (stating that the proper inquiry is whether Congress had a “‘rational
basis’” for concluding that the regulated activity has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce”); id. at 26 (“Prohibiting the intrastate possession or
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the majority opinion in full,153 his subsequent concurring opinion in
Comstock criticizing rational-basis review for Congress’s power under
the Necessary and Proper Clause suggests that he may not support the
majority’s lenient standard of review.154 Thus, prior to NFIB v.
Sebelius, a majority of the Court seemed to support a more stringent
standard of review in Commerce Clause cases than rational basis.
III. NFIB V. SEBELIUS
In the Court’s decision on the constitutionality of the individual
mandate in the Affordable Care Act (ACA),155 the Necessary and
Proper Clause played a distinct, although not prominent, role in the
Justices’ analyses.156 Each of the three opinions mentioned the
Necessary and Proper Clause specifically and factored it into its
analysis.157 Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion focused on the word
“proper,” concluding that the mandate was not “proper” within the
meaning of the clause because it was not an “incidental power” that

153
154

155

156

157

manufacture of an article of commerce is a rational (and commonly utilized)
means of regulating commerce in that product.”) (emphasis added); id. at 28-29
(“[Congress’s conclusion that homegrown marijuana will affect the market for
marijuana] is not only rational, but ‘visible to the naked eye’ under any
commonsense appraisal of the probable consequences of such an open-ended
exemption.”) (emphasis added).
Raich, 545 U.S. at 3.
See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 150-56 (2010) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring with the judgment) (criticizing the majority’s use of rational-basis
review when determining Congress’s authority under the Necessary and Proper
Clause).
The Affordable Care Act provides that individuals who are not otherwise
covered by their employers or the government must purchase private health
insurance or make a “shared responsibility payment” to the government. NFIB
v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012). The precise amount of the payment is
to be determined by the IRS based on the individual’s annual income. Id.
Plaintiffs filed suit, claiming that the government “mandate” was not within
Congress’s enumerated powers and therefore was unconstitutional. Id.
The opinion of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent both had a
separate section in which they considered the mandate under the Necessary and
Proper Clause, while the joint concurrence included the clause in the context of
the Government’s argument that the mandate was “‘integral’” to the
effectiveness of the ACA and, as such, should be upheld. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at
2579, 2591-93; id. at 2625-26 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part); id. at 2646-47
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., concurring in part).
See note 156 and accompanying text.
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was “narrow in scope,” but rather was one that taken to its logical
extreme, “would work a substantial expansion of federal authority.”158
Similarly, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito, in their joint
concurrence, focused on the “principle of enumerated (and hence
limited) federal power” and concluded that if the government could
mandate citizens buy a product, its power would be “limitless.”159
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, on the other hand, focused on the fact that
the mandate was “an integral part” of the ACA’s goals to regulate the
healthcare market, and therefore the regulation was constitutional in
the context of this “complex regulatory program.”160 All three opinions
represented different approaches to defining the role of the Necessary
and Proper Clause in the context of Commerce Clause cases.161
A. The Opinion of Chief Justice Roberts
Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the individual mandate was
not a “proper” use of federal power and therefore could not be upheld
under Congress’s necessary and proper power.162 After concluding that
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause did not include the
power to compel citizens to buy health insurance,163 the Chief Justice
158
159

160

161
162
163

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592 (opinion of Roberts, J.).
Id. at 2646 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., concurring in part). Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito concurred in Chief Justice Roberts’
judgment with regards to the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper
Clause issues, but did not join his opinion. Id. at 2575. However, they dissented
on the Court’s holding that the mandate was constitutional under Congress’s
taxing power. Id. For ease of reference, this Article refers to this opinion as the
“joint concurrence.”
Id. at 2625 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, which
was joined by Justices Kagan, Breyer, and Sotomayor, concurred in the Court’s
opinion that the mandate was constitutional under Congress’s taxing power, but
dissented from the Court’s holding that the mandate was unconstitutional under
the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id. at 2575. For
ease of reference, this Article refers to this opinion as “Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent.”
See infra Part III.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592 (opinion of Roberts, J.).
Id. at 2589-91 (opinion of Roberts, J.). Roberts also rejected the argument raised
by the government and supported by Justice Ginsburg’s dissent that because
everyone will need healthcare at some time in their life, people are always active
in the health care market and, therefore, the mandate regulated current activity
rather than compelled participation in it. Id. at 2591; see id. at 2620 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting in part). Chief Justice Roberts responded that “[t]he Commerce
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then turned to the government’s argument under the Necessary and
Proper Clause.164 He started his analysis by emphasizing that the
clause only allows Congress to exercise powers “incidental” to
enumerated powers and not “independent power[s] beyond those
specifically enumerated.”165 He then asserted that the mandate would
give Congress “the extraordinary ability to create the necessary
predicate to the exercise of an enumerated power.”166 This power, he
argued, is not “narrow in scope or incidental to the exercise of the
commerce power.”167 Thus, while the mandate may be “necessary” for
the ACA to work, it is not “proper” and therefore not within
Congress’s necessary and proper power.168
B. Joint Concurrence’s Opinion
The joint concurrence concluded that because allowing the
individual mandate would destroy the federal system of enumerated
power, it could not be upheld under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.169 Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito concurred with
Chief Justice Roberts’s holding that the mandate was unconstitutional
under the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause, but did
not join his opinion.170 Unlike the opinions of Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Ginsburg, the joint concurrence incorporated the Necessary
and Proper Clause into its Commerce Clause argument, rather than
addressing it separately.171
While addressing the government’s argument that the mandate was
an essential part of a larger regulatory scheme, the joint concurrence
declared that “the Commerce Clause, even when supplemented by the
Necessary and Proper Clause, is not carte blanche for doing whatever
will help achieve the ends Congress seeks by the regulation of

164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171

Clause is not a general license to regulate an individual from cradle to grave,
simple because he will predictably engage in particular transactions.” Id. at 2591
(opinion of Roberts, J.).
See id. at 2591-92.
Id. at 2591.
Id.
Id. at 2592.
Id.
Id. at 2647 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., concurring in part).
Id. at 2575.
Id. at 2644-46 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., concurring in part).
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commerce.”172 The joint concurrence extrapolated this point, arguing
that Congress exceeds its necessary and proper power when “the
congressional action directly violates the sovereignty of the States”
and “when it violates the background principle of enumerated (and
hence limited) federal power.”173 The joint concurrence concluded that
the mandate “represent[s] the expansion of federal power into a broad
new field” that would give Congress “limitless” authority.174
Therefore, because allowing the mandate would destroy the system of
enumerated powers, the joint concurrence concluded that it is
unconstitutional under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper
Clauses.175
C. Justice Ginsburg’s Opinion
Justice Ginsburg concluded that the individual mandate was
constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause because it was
an “essential part” of a larger regulatory scheme.176 Similar to Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinion, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent177 begins with a
discussion of the constitutionality of the mandate under the Commerce
Clause and then further considers it under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.178 After finding that the mandate was constitutional under the
Commerce Clause,179 Justice Ginsburg added that “[w]hen viewed as a
component of the entire ACA, the provision’s constitutionality
becomes even plainer.”180 Justice Ginsburg noted that the Court has
consistently held that a challenged provision that is an “integral part”
of a larger regulatory scheme is constitutional, even if the same act
individually would not be within congressional authority.181 Notably,
172
173

174

175
176
177
178
179
180
181

Id at 2646.
Id.; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997) (holding that a
law is not “Necessary and Proper” if it “violates the principle of state
sovereignty reflected in . . . various constitutional provisions”).
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2646 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., concurring in
part).
Id. at 2647.
Id. at 2652 (Ginsburg J., dissenting in part).
See note 160 and accompanying text.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2618-25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 2625.
Id.
Id. at 2625-26.
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Justice Ginsburg cited Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Raich to
support the position that each individual part of a regulatory scheme
need not be independently authorized by the Commerce Clause.182
Justice Ginsburg then noted the important role that the mandate plays
in the ACA, allowing Congress to prohibit health insurance companies
from withholding coverage from people with preexisting conditions
without significantly increasing the cost of health insurance
premiums.183 As such, she concluded that the mandate is essential to
the larger regulation in the ACA and therefore within Congress’s
powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause.184
IV. EXPANSIVE OR LIMITING?
The opinions in NFIB v. Sebelius suggest two basic directions in
which the Court could take its Necessary and Proper Clause
jurisprudence. The first approach, reflected in Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent and mirroring the expansive language from McCulloch,185
views the Necessary and Proper Clause as allowing Congress to enact
any law that it could rationally conclude has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce or is an essential part of a larger scheme that
regulates interstate commerce.186 This “expansive approach” to the
Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress wide, bordering on
infinite, latitude to choose the means to reach its regulation of
interstate commerce.187
The other approach, enunciated in Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion
and the joint concurrence, would limit Congress’s powers under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to those already granted explicitly in its
182

183

184
185
186
187

Id. at 2626 (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 35 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)); see supra Part II.B.3 (describing Justice Scalia’s view on the
relationship between the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Commerce
Clause).
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2626 (Ginsburg J., dissenting in part) (“Without the
individual mandate [the ban on denying coverage to people with pre-existing
conditions] would trigger an adverse-selection death-spiral in the healthinsurance market; insurance premiums would skyrocket, the number of
uninsured would increase, and insurance companies would exit the market.”).
Id.
See supra Part III.C; supra Part II.A.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.A.
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commerce power and only such minor or incidental powers as may be
necessary to enforce its commerce authority.188 This “limiting
approach” would circumscribe congressional authority tightly to its
enumerated powers and invalidate any laws that are weakly related to
the regulation of interstate commerce and those that are so expansive
that they run against the principle of enumerated powers.189 Neither
approach, however, is sufficiently nuanced to balance the competing
interests of congressional flexibility and the principle of enumerated
powers. Furthermore, neither approach clearly delineates the specific
role that the Necessary and Proper Clause plays in the analysis,
creating uncertainty for future cases involving the Commerce Clause
cases.
A. The Expansive Approach
Two separate, but interacting, ideas form the expansive approach
to Congress’s commerce power. The first is that Congress need only
have a “rational basis” to conclude that the means it adopts have an
appropriate link to an enumerated power.190 In the context of the
Commerce Clause, this requires that Congress offer only a “rational
basis” to conclude that any intrastate activity, in the aggregate, has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.191 This approach rejects the
requirement that the regulated intrastate activity must be a commercial

188
189
190

191

See infra Part IV.A-B.
See infra Part IV.A-B.
NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2616 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part)
(“When appraising [legislation under the Commerce Clause], we ask only (1)
whether Congress had a ‘rational basis’ for concluding that the regulated activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, and (2) whether there is a reasonable
connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends.”);
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (“In assessing the scope of Congress’s
Commerce Clause authority, the Court need not determine whether respondents’
activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact,
but only whether a “rational basis” exists for so concluding.”); United States v.
Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 134 (2010) (articulating the standard of review under
the Necessary and Proper Clause as whether “the statute constitutes a means that
is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated
power”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 617 (1995) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he specific question before us . . . is not whether the ‘regulated
activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce,’ but, rather, whether Congress
could have had ‘a rational basis’ for so concluding.”).
See note 190 and accompanying text.
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or economic activity.192 Instead, this approach would permit Congress
to pass statutes regulating gun possession in a school zone and gendermotivated violence because Congress could have rationally concluded,
through a chain of causation, that these activities would affect
interstate commerce.193 In the context of the Necessary and Proper
Clause specifically, the expansive approach holds that the Court will
not invalidate a statute so long as it “constitutes a means that is
rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally
enumerated power.”194 Provided that the Court can find a rational
connection between a regulation and an enumerated power, it should
not invalidate an act of Congress.195
The second major theme of the expansive approach is that one
piece of a larger regulatory scheme that is not connected directly to an
enumerated power will not be excised from that scheme.196 When a
comprehensive regulatory scheme is enacted, it is not necessary that
each and every part of that scheme be “‘independently and directly’”
related to an enumerated power.197 So long as the larger scheme would
be “undercut” without the lesser provision, the lesser provision is
acceptable under the Necessary and Proper Clause.198
One other expansive approach to the Commerce Clause that finds
support in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent is the “collective action”
theory.199 Proponents of this theory argue that the main impetus behind
192
193

194
195
196

197

198

199

See supra Part II.B.2.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 618-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 628-37 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
Comstock, 560 U.S. at 134.
See note 190 and accompanying text.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2625-26 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part); Raich, 545 U.S. at
23 (“[W]e have often reiterated that where the class of activities is regulated and
that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power ‘to
excise, as trivial, individual instances’ of the class.”).
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2625-26 (quoting Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 n.17
(1981)).
Id. at 2626 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561); see also Parry, supra note 148
(writing that “the only clear doctrinal result of the [Raich] decision is that pieces
of comprehensive regulatory programs will be upheld precisely because they are
part of a larger program”).
See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, Textualism and Federalism: The Third
Translation of the Commerce Clause: Congressional Power to Regulate Social
Problems, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1206 (1998) (arguing that “courts
could translate the list of congressional powers in Article I, Section 8 of the
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the creation of Congress’s enumerated powers in Article I Section 8
was to empower Congress to solve interstate problems that the states
could not handle on their own.200 Under this approach, the main
inquiry is whether the issue that Congress is addressing is one that the
individual states would have difficulty regulating on their own.201 If
this is true, any regulation that is part of that larger scheme is
constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The expansive approach gives Congress the flexibility to meet
national problems that states are unable to handle, which was one of
the driving forces behind the formation of the Constitution.202
Furthermore, its emphasis on giving Congress leeway to pick
individual provisions that facilitate a larger regulatory scheme
promotes the effective “execution” of congressional enumerated
powers. However, this approach places no meaningful limits on
congressional authority.203 Congress could rationally conclude that
nearly any activity taken in the aggregate could affect interstate

200

201
202
203

Constitution to allow Congress to regulate any subject that the states cannot
govern effectively on their own” and supporting such a change in the Court’s
jurisprudence); Donald R. Goodson, Toward a Unitary Commerce Clause: What
the Negative Commerce Clause Reveals About the Commerce Power, 61 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 745, 790 (“To further economic union, Congress [should be able] to
solve collective action problems where a rule of uniformity is needed due to the
interstate nature of a given economic activity.”).
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2615 (2012) (Ginsburg J., dissenting in part) (arguing that
Constitution was ratified mainly because “the individual States . . . often failed
to take actions critical to the success of the Nation as a whole”); see, e.g., Neil S.
Siegel, Distinguishing the “Truly National” from the “Truly Local”: Customary
Allocation, Commercial Activity, and Collective Action, 62 DUKE L. J. 797-98
(2012) (arguing that “the Framers drafted Article I, Section 8 primarily to
empower Congress to ameliorate serious problems of collective action facing the
states”); Merritt, supra note 199, at 1210 (“By 1787, the states already had
shown that they could not effectively regulate commerce with other nations or
among themselves . . . The Framers addressed [this] specific problem[] in
Section 8.”).
See notes 199-200.
See notes 199-200.
United States v. Lopez 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (“I]f we were to accept the
Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an
individual that Congress is without power to regulate.”); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (noting that the link between violence and
interstate commerce was so attenuated that allowing regulation based on such a
tenuous link would “obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national
and local authority.”).

326

UMass Law Review

v. 10 | 294

commerce,204 and the Court’s rational-basis review would permit it to
do so.205 This is also true of the expansive approach to larger
regulatory schemes. Since only a “rational relationship” is required
between the means and the end, any provision could be upheld as
peripherally relevant to the larger scheme. The expansive approach’s
lenient rational-basis review does not tie Congress closely enough to
its enumerated powers to make the limitation meaningful.206
B. The Limiting Approach
Both Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion and the joint concurrence in
NFIB v. Sebelius applied a limiting approach to Congress’s commerce
power.207 However, they represent two separate frameworks for
limiting that power.208 The joint concurrence followed the “New
Federalism” approach and refused to expand the scope of federal
power past the limits established during the New Deal in order to
avoid the creation of a national police power.209 Chief Justice
Roberts’s opinion took an originalist approach, focusing on the word
“proper” and arguing for a very limited reading of the Necessary and
Proper Clause.210 While both approaches place real limitations on
congressional power, neither creates a coherent framework that the
Court can use going forward.211
204
205

206
207

208

209
210
211

See note 203.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (noting that if Congress could regulate possession of a
gun in a school zone it could completely take over criminal law enforcement and
education, areas that have historically been only the province of state
governments).
See note 203.
See supra Part III.A (describing Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion finding that the
individual mandate was not constitutional under the Necessary and Proper
Clause); see supra Part III.B (describing the joint concurrence’s opinion finding
that the individual mandate was not constitutional under the Necessary and
Proper Clause).
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined Chief Justice Roberts’s
judgment that the mandate was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause
and the Necessary and Proper Clause, but did not join his opinion. NFIB v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2575 (2012).
See infra Part IV.B.1.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
See generally Part IV.B.1-2 (discussing the problems with the limiting
approaches enunciated in Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion and the joint
concurrence).
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1. New Federalism
The limiting approach enunciated in the joint concurrence is
primarily concerned with the implications of finding the individual
mandate constitutional—mainly that such a ruling would create a
national police power.212 However, similar to the Court’s rulings in
Lopez and Morrison, the joint concurrence did not directly attack
established New Deal precedent that greatly broadened congressional
authority.213 Instead, it emphasized that going any further would create
a congressional police power.214 This reflects what Professor Randy
Barnett refers to as the “New Federalism” that emerged from the
Rehnquist Court.215 According to Barnett, “New Federalism” has two
main tenets.216 First, New Federalism accepts the increase in federal
power that occurred during the New Deal, but insists that any increase
in power above that level is unacceptable unless supported by
extremely strong justifications.217 Second, New Federalism rejects any
increase in congressional authority that those Justices believe would
result in a congressional police power.218
The “New Federalism” reflected by the joint concurrence in NFIB
v. Sebelius places real limitations on congressional authority without
212

213
214

215
216
217
218

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2646 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., concurring in
part) (writing that, “[i]f Congress can reach out and command even those
furthest removed from an interstate market to participate in the market, then the
Commerce Clause becomes a font of unlimited power”); id. (“The mandating of
economic activity . . . is a field so limitless that it converts the Commerce Clause
into a general authority to direct the economy.”); id. at 2647 (noting that at oral
arguments the Government was unable to state anything the government could
not regulate under its formulation of Congress’s necessary and proper power);
id. at 2648 (arguing that if the mandate is upheld, “the idea of a limited
Government power is at an end”).
See text accompanying note 95.
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2644-48 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ.,
concurring in part); Randy E. Barnett, The New Originalism in Constitutional
Law: The Gravitational force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 428
(2013) (noting that NFIB did not raise any arguments about original meaning of
the Necessary and Proper or Commerce Clauses or challenge the mandates the
act placed on insurance companies, and that the Court based its decision solely
on the unprecedented nature of the mandate).
Barnett, supra note 214, at 428-29.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 429.
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undermining the core principles enunciated by the Court since
Darby.219 This limiting approach protects against an unlimited federal
power by emphasizing that a federal regulation not authorized under a
specific enumerated power must actually “carry into Execution” an
enumerated power, and is not creating a new independent authority.220
Furthermore, it also protects against congressional overreaching,
recognizing that any activity can ultimately be connected through a
chain of inferences to interstate commerce and requires a reasonable
connection between the means and the end of interstate commerce.221
However, the New Federalist approach does not answer perhaps
the most important question relating to the Necessary and Proper
Clause and Congress’s commerce power—where do we draw the
line?222 The Court has indicated that any power that would lead to the
creation of a police power is impermissible, but it has offered no
principled way to determine when this line has been crossed. 223 As
Justice Ginsburg noted in her Sebelius dissent, any power taken to the
extreme can become oppressive.224 Any step that increases federal
power could be seen as one step down the “slippery-slope” to a police
power.225 Thus, while preventing a congressional police power is a
219
220
221
222

223
224

225

See text accompanying note 214.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
See text accompanying note 203.
NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2627-28 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in
part) (“How is a judge to decide, when ruling on the constitutionality of a
federal statute, whether Congress employed an ‘independent power,’ or merely a
‘derivative’ one? Whether the power used is ‘substantive,’ or just
‘incidental’?”).
Id.
Id. at 2625 (noting that “[w]hen contemplated in its extreme, almost any power
looks dangerous” and later adding that “the commerce power, hypothetically,
would enable Congress to prohibit the purchase and home production of all
meat, fish, and dairy goods, effectively compelling Americans to eat only
vegetables. Yet no one would offer the ‘hypothetical and unreal possibilit[y],’ of
a vegetarian state as a credible reason to deny Congress the authority ever to ban
the possession and sale of goods”); see Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 363
(1903) (“[T]he possible abuse of a power is not an argument against its
existence.”).
See Alicia Ouellette, Health Reform and the Supreme Court: The ACA Survives
the Battle of the Broccoli and Fortified Itself Against Future Fatal Attack, 76
ALB. L. REV. 87, 98 (2012) (calling the argument NFIB used, and was largely
accepted by the Court, a “classic slippery slope argument”).
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proper goal, New Federalism provides no way to determine when the
line has been crossed.226
Additionally, the New Federalist approach is arbitrary to the extent
that it is not based in the text of the Constitution. For example, the
distinction between local economic and non-economic activity, while a
convenient way for the Court to limit federal power without
contradicting precedent, is not a distinction supported by the text of the
Necessary and Proper Clause.227 In fact, the clause clearly states that
Congress may pass “[a]ll laws which shall be necessary and proper,”
not only a certain type or class of laws.228 Furthermore, why this line?
Perhaps, as Barnett suggests, it is the best that the New Federalists can
do.229 Since the New Deal expansion is now settled precedent, the
New Federalists are trying to mitigate the damage by preventing
further expansion.230 Nevertheless, drawing an arbitrary line is not the
way to create a coherent framework moving forward.
2. “Proper” Congressional Power
Chief Justice Roberts’s formulation of the limiting approach is
similar to the joint concurrence’s approach, but rather than focusing
solely on general principles of federalism, he justifies his limited
reading by focusing on the word “proper.”231 While Chief Justice
Roberts offers no authority that directly supports the proposition that
an act can be “necessary” but not “proper,” he does cite Printz v.
United States earlier in that section.232 In Printz, the Court held that the
226
227

228

229

230
231
232

See text accompanying notes 222-25.
Barnett, supra note 214, at 431 (noting that many law professors have criticized
the court’s economic noneconomic distinction drawn in Lopez and Morrison as
arbitrary and unrelated to the Constitution’s text).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 640 (1995)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that a categorical rule prohibiting Congress from
regulating noncommercial activity is textually suspect considering that the
Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to enact all powers that are
necessary and proper).
Barnett, supra note 214, at 428-29; see also Beck, supra note 19, at 622 (arguing
that the economic/noneconomic distinction in Lopez and Morrison could be
viewed “as an interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause designed to
prevent Congress from employing means remote from its power to regulate
interstate commerce”).
See note 229.
See supra Part III.A; NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591-92 (2012).
Id. (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997)).
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federal government could not compel state officers to enforce federal
law.233 In responding to the dissent’s argument that Congress had
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to use state officials
to enforce federal law,234 the majority held that because the statute
violates the principle of state sovereignty, it was not a “proper”
exercise of congressional power.235
The majority in Printz cited no case law to support its claim that a
law can be “improper,”236 but rather referred to an article authored by
Professors Gary Lawson and Patricia Granger.237 In this article,
Lawson and Granger argue that when the Necessary and Proper Clause
was enacted, the terms “necessary” and “proper” had distinct meanings
and thus are not synonymous.238 For an act to be “proper,” it must be
one that does not tread on individual rights, state’s rights, or the
separation of powers.239 As such, Congress may not “regulate or
prohibit activities that fall outside the subject areas specifically
enumerated in the Constitution.”240 Rather, the Necessary and Proper
Clause solely authorizes Congress “to provide enforcement machinery,
prescribe penalties, authorize the hiring of employees, appropriate
funds, and so forth to effectuate” an enumerated power, not to create
new powers to make the enforcement of the enumerated power more
efficient.241
233
234
235

236
237

238
239

240
241

Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
Id. at 941 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 924 (majority opinion). The idea that a statute is not “proper” if it violates
state sovereignty is also reflected in the joint concurrence’s position that the
Necessary and Proper Clause does not allow Congress to pass a statute if it
violates the principles of state sovereignty or enumerated powers. See text
accompanying note 173.
521 U.S. at 924.
Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993).
Id. at 272, 286, 289-97.
Id. at 272, 336. Lawson and Granger refer to their approach as the “jurisdictional
meaning” of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Id. at 331.
Id. (“To carry a law or power into execution in its most basic sense means to
provide enforcement machinery, prescribe penalties, authorize the hiring of
employees, appropriate funds, and so forth to effectuate that law or power. It
does not mean to regulate unenumerated subject areas to make the exercise of
enumerated powers more efficient.”).
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Similar to the New Federalism approach, this approach would
impose substantial limitations on Congress’s authority.242 However,
Lawson and Granger’s originalist approach is subject to many of the
same criticisms of the New Federalist approach; specifically, when
does a regulation cross the line from being an acceptable enforcement
mechanism to an impermissible regulation that violates the principles
of federalism, individual rights, or the separation of powers?243
However, assuming the historical veracity of their claims, 244 this
approach—unlike New Federalism—is supported textually through the
use of the word “proper.”245
Nevertheless, this approach has two significant problems of its
own. First, it would appear to give Congress little flexibility to deal
with modern-day problems.246 Rather, it would only allow Congress
the most basic enforcement mechanisms for regulating interstate
commerce.247 The second related, and perhaps most daunting, problem
with this approach is that it is contrary to the vast majority of the
Court’s jurisprudence.248 In McCulloch, the Court stated the basic
principle that the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress leeway
to choose reasonable means to enforce their enumerated powers.249
Furthermore, the Court, since Darby, has expanded the clause well
242
243
244

245
246
247
248
249

See text accompanying notes 219-21.
See text accompanying notes 222-25.
Granger and Lawson admit to “serious flaws in the documentary record,” but
nonetheless conclude that these flaws do not undermine their thesis. See
Lawson, supra note 237, at 334-35. A recent article by Professor John Mikhail
challenges Granger and Lawson’s argument that the Necessary and Proper
Clause, as understood at the time it was written, limited congressional authority
to its enumerated powers. John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses,
102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1057-58 (2014) (arguing that the enumeration of three
distinct Necessary and Proper Clauses suggests that “the Constitution vests the
Government of the United States with implied or non-enumerated powers,
which go beyond the enumerated powers” and that these implied powers “were
part of an original understanding of the Constitution” when drafted 225 years
ago). Whether or not Granger and Lawson’s historical argument is factually
correct is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this Article explores what the
legal and practical significance of their approach would be.
See supra Part IV.B.2.
See text accompanying note 241.
See id.
See supra Part II.B.1
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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beyond what would seem appropriate under this approach,250 requiring
an extensive, and very unlikely, change in the Court’s jurisprudence.
Thus, the originalist approach, proposed by Lawson and Granger and
suggested by Chief Justice Roberts, is both too inflexible and too
radical to be a viable framework in future Commerce Clause cases.251
V. THE MEANS-ENDS FRAMEWORK
In order to define the relationship between the Commerce Clause
and the Necessary and Proper Clause, it is important first to delineate
the different roles that each plays. Justice Scalia’s framework from his
concurrence in Raich lays a strong foundation for such delineation.252
The Commerce Clause, as one of Congress’s enumerated powers,
gives Congress direct authority to regulate interstate commerce. 253 As
such, the first two categories of the traditional Commerce Clause
framework—Congress’s ability to regulate the channels and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce—derive directly from that
enumerated power, as these are “the ingredients of interstate
commerce itself.”254 However, a regulation of purely intrastate
activities, by definition, is not a regulation of interstate commerce.255
Thus, congressional authority to regulate purely intrastate activities
cannot come solely from the Commerce Clause.256

250
251

252

253

254
255

256

See supra Part III.B.1.
NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2628-29 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in
part) (“In the early 20th century, this Court regularly struck down economic
regulation enacted by the peoples’ representatives in both the States and the
Federal Government. The Chief Justice’s Commerce Clause opinion, and . . . the
[joint concurrence’s] reasoning, bear a disquieting resemblance to those longoverruled decisions.”).
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34-38 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the authority to “[t]o regulate
Commerce . . . among the several states”).
Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. (arguing that intrastate activities that have an effect on interstate commerce
“are not themselves part of interstate commerce, and thus the power to regulate
them cannot come from the Commerce Clause alone. Rather, [Congress’s power
to regulate these activities] derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause.”).
Id.
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The Necessary and Proper Clause, in contrast to the Commerce
Clause, gives Congress no additional independent authority.257 Rather,
it offers Congress the choice of means that are “necessary and proper”
to “execute” its enumerated powers.258 Therefore, any power not
directly supported by an enumerated power is only permissible if it is
used as a means, not an independent end. Since intrastate regulations
often may support Congress’s policies with regard to interstate
commerce, such regulations may be permissible under the Necessary
and Proper Clause.259 Therefore, any congressional regulation of an
intrastate activity, while impermissible under the Commerce Clause,
may be permissible under the Necessary and Proper Clause.260
In sum, the Commerce Clause only authorizes Congress to regulate
interstate commerce directly, while the Necessary and Proper Clause
authorizes Congress to enact means to effectuate those regulations.
The regulation of intrastate activities can serve as an effective means
to enforce a regulation of interstate commerce.261 Consistent with this
“Means-End Framework,” congressional regulation of intrastate
257

258

259

260

261

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591 (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause “does
not license the exercise of any [powers] beyond those specifically enumerated”).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. 316, 413 (1819)
(holding that the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to enact
legislation which is a reasonable or “useful” means to enforce its enumerated
powers); see also Beck, supra note 19, at 584 (arguing that the Necessary and
Proper Clause “regulate[s] the relationship between congressional means and
constitutional ends”). But see Mikhail, supra note 244, at 1054, 1057-58
(arguing that the text and history surrounding the drafting of the Necessary and
Proper Clauses imply that Congress is vested with some unenumerated powers,
but declining to answer the question of which unenumerated powers it vests with
them).
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (finding that
regulating the amount of wheat a farmer grew for personal consumption aided in
Congress’s attempts to stimulate the market for wheat); Raich, 545 U.S. at 19
(finding that prohibiting the production and consumption of marijuana for
personal use aided Congress’s regulation of the interstate market for marijuana).
Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Congress’s regulatory authority
over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce . . .
derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause.”).
See, e.g., Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29 (finding that regulating the amount of
wheat a farmer grew for personal consumption aided in Congress’s attempts to
stimulate the market for wheat); Raich, 545 U.S. at 19 (finding that prohibiting
the production and consumption of marijuana for personal use aided Congress’s
regulation of the interstate market in marijuana).
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activities should only be permissible through the Necessary and Proper
Clause if they are a means to enforcing a regulation of interstate
commerce.262
A. Three-Prong Test
Once the role of the Necessary and Proper Clause is defined as
providing the means to enforce Congress’s enumerated powers, the
next question is, what means are permissible? In determining whether
an intrastate regulation is permissible under the Commerce and
Necessary and Proper Clauses, the Court should adopt a three-part test.
This test is a variation on the Court’s traditional formulation of
intermediate scrutiny.263 First, the regulation must be part of a larger
statutory scheme that predominates over the individual regulation.264
Second, the larger statutory scheme must directly regulate interstate
commerce.265 Finally, the regulation must substantially relate to the
economic and/or commercial goals of the larger scheme.266 This test
emphasizes the role of the Necessary and Proper Clause to provide
means to enforce a power, rather than an additional power.267
Furthermore, it gives Congress the flexibility to choose the means of
executing its powers without giving it a national police power.268
1. “Carrying into Execution”
Any federal regulation of a purely intrastate activity should be
constitutional only if it is part of a larger statutory scheme. The
Necessary and Proper clause explicitly ties congressional power to its
262
263

264
265
266
267
268

Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979) (defining intermediate scrutiny in the
context of an equal protection challenge to a gender classification as requiring
that the classification serve an important government interest and be
substantially related to meeting that objective).
See infra Part V.A.1.
See infra Part V.A.2.
See infra Part V.A.3.
See text accompanying notes 257-58.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819) (“[The Necessary and Proper
Clause] is . . . in a constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”); see also
NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2629 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority’s decision striking down the mandate under the
Commerce Clause will “hem in Congress’s capacity to meet the new problems
arising constantly in our ever-developing modern economy”).
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enumerated powers; it does not create an additional power.269 A
regulation cannot “carry into execution” an enumerated power unless
it aids in the effectiveness of an enumerated power. Thus, individual
statutes of the sort challenged in Lopez and Morrison should be per se
unconstitutional because they simply regulate intrastate activities for
their own sake, not in the service of some larger scheme of economic
regulation.270 This approach is strongly supported by precedent and a
majority of the Court.271 While the Justices disagree as to the extent to
which a larger regulatory scheme is necessary or sufficient for
constitutionality,272 they accept, as a general matter, that a regulation
that is part of a larger scheme that regulates interstate commerce is
more likely to be a valid exercise of Congress’s enumerated powers.273
Additionally, it should not suffice that the intrastate regulation is
part of a larger statutory scheme; the scheme should predominate over
the intrastate regulation. This restriction serves two functions. First, it
ensures that the intrastate activity is merely in service of the
enumerated power of regulating interstate commerce and is not the
predominant end that Congress intends to effect.274 This keeps
Congress’s authority on the interstate level in accordance with its
enumerated power and restricts it to only such intrastate regulations as
may serve that larger scheme.275 Second, it ensures that Congress
cannot regulate intrastate commerce merely by including the
regulation within a statute that contains some interstate regulations.
For example, a federal statute that banned the possession of a gun in a
269
270

271
272

273
274

275

See text accompanying notes 257-58.
See Raich, 545 U.S. at 23 (distinguishing Raich from Lopez and Morrison by
noting that Lopez and Morrison involved statutes that were wholly independent
of a larger statutory scheme regulating interstate commerce, whereas the
regulation in Raich was part of a “concededly valid statutory scheme”); see also
supra Part II.B.2.
See text accompanying notes 147-49.
Compare NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012) (arguing that even if
the individual mandate was necessary to the regulatory scheme of the ACA, it
was nonetheless improper), with 132 S. Ct. at 2625-26 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the mandate was clearly constitutional under the Necessary and
Proper Clause because it is an essential part of a larger regulatory scheme of
interstate commerce).
See text accompanying notes 147-49.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591 (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause “does
not license the exercise of any [powers] beyond those specifically enumerated”).
Id.
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school zone would not be constitutional simply because a separate
provision of the same statute provided for funding for the interstate
highway system.276 The larger economic scheme must predominate,
with the intrastate regulation as a mere tool toward the effectiveness of
that regulation.
2. “An Enumerated Power”
Consistent with the Means-Ends Framework, the larger scheme
itself must regulate interstate commerce. This provides the enumerated
“end” that is the necessary prerequisite for a regulation justified by the
Necessary and Proper Clause.277 If the scheme does not further an
objective that is economic or commercial in nature, then there is no
enumerated power on which to anchor the Necessary and Proper
Clause, and, therefore, that individual regulation cannot be sustained
under that power. 278
3. Substantially Related
The Court has long struggled over what degree of connection is
required between a law and an enumerated power to be justified under
the Necessary and Proper Clause.279 While the Court since McCulloch
has recognized that the regulation need not be essential, 280 many
Justices have criticized the lenient rational-basis review that the Court
has frequently applied.281 The application of an intermediate scrutiny
276

277
278

279
280
281

There would also be an issue as to whether the regulation is “substantially
related” to a larger economic scheme. This issue will be addressed more fully,
infra Part V.A.3.
See text accompanying notes 257-58.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (giving Congress the authority “To make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution” its enumerated
powers).
See supra Part II.A.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 413, 416 (1819).
See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 151-52 (2010) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (arguing against the majority’s use of a lenient form
of rational-basis review when analyzing a statute under the Necessary and
Proper Clause); 560 U.S. at 158 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“Although the term ‘necessary’ does not mean ‘absolutely necessary’ or
indispensable, the term requires an ‘appropriate’ link between a power conferred
by the Constitution and the law enacted by Congress.”); see also United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (stating that the Court will not “pile
inference upon inference” to find a connection between an intrastate regulation
and interstate commerce).
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standard, which requires that the means “substantially relate[]” to an
enumerated power,282 would resolve this issue by giving Congress
leeway to choose reasonable means, while forbidding regulations with
the remotest of connections to interstate commerce.
Intermediate scrutiny has been most commonly applied in equalprotection cases involving classifications based upon gender.283 The
precise meaning of “substantially relate” is far from clear, and many
have criticized the standard.284 However, intermediate scrutiny is the
best standard of review in this situation for two main reasons. First, it
constitutes a middle ground between the lenient rational basis
standard, criticized by many of the Justices, and a strict scrutiny
standard rejected in McCulloch,285 which would handcuff Congress to
only means that are “narrowly tailored”286 or “absolutely
necessary.”287 Second, the standard is firmly entrenched in Supreme
Court jurisprudence and supported by case law.288 Thus, despite the
282
283

284

285

286

287
288

Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979).
Norman T. Deutsch, Nguyen v. INS and the Application of Intermediate Scrutiny
to Gender Classifications: Theory, Practice, and Reality, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 185,
186 (2003) (noting that “[a]ll of the justices agreed that the statute created a
gender classification and intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard of
review”) (citing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 60-61, 74-75 (2001)).
See, e.g., Kimberly J. Jenkins, Constitutional Lessons for the Next Generation of
Public Single-sex Elementary and Middle Schools, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1953, 2036 (2006) (arguing that intermediate scrutiny is unpredictable and
attempting to “systematize intermediate scrutiny in the context of single-sex
public schools”); Deutsch, supra note 283, at 186, 187 (arguing that the
application of intermediate scrutiny to gender classifications “continues to be
troublesome” and that “[i]n reality, intermediate scrutiny in gender cases is a
form of rational-basis review”).
See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (rejecting an
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause that would require that a
Congressional regulation supported by that clause be “absolutely necessary” to
enforcing an enumerated power).
Strict scrutiny requires the government to show that its regulation is narrowly
tailored to a compelling government interest. See, e.g., Johnson v. California,
543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (applying strict scrutiny in the context of an equal
protection challenge to a racial classification); United States v. Playboy Entm’t
Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (1999) (applying strict scrutiny in the context of a
content-based restriction on speech).
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 414.
The first case to apply intermediate scrutiny to gender classifications was Craig
v. Boren. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Since 1982, intermediate scrutiny “has been the
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uncertainty surrounding when a means is “substantially related,”289 the
Court has a familiar framework and applications of that framework to
draw from.
This approach rejects a per se distinction between regulations of
“economic and non-economic” activity or between regulations of
“activity” and “inactivity” for a number of reasons. First, these
classifications are difficult to make and, in many circumstances, make
no meaningful difference.290 Second, such delineations are
unnecessary under this approach to prevent a congressional police
power. These distinctions were made as part of the “New Federalist”
movement in the Court, which sought to prevent further expansion of
congressional power toward a police power.291 The requirement that a
regulation be part of a larger scheme and substantially relate to that
scheme limits Congress’s discretion to choose means that bear a
substantial relationship to their enumerated power.292 Thus, it is
unnecessary to draw an arbitrary line between regulations of activity
and inactivity or economic and non-economic activities. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, such limitations are not supported by the
text of the Constitution.293 The Necessary and Proper Clause allows
Congress to pass “all laws which are necessary and proper,” not “laws
of economic activities.”294 Thus any intrastate regulation, so long as it

289
290

291
292
293

294

consistent standard of a majority of the Court” in equal protection challenges to
gender classifications. See Deutsch, supra note 283, at 195.
See note 284.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2626 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
courts and Congress will have difficulty “distinguishing statutes that regulate
‘activity’ from those that regulate ‘inactivity’”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 629 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (arguing that it is difficult to distinguish between economic and
noneconomic activities).
See text accompanying notes 214-18, 228-32.
See supra Part V.A.1-2.
Siegel, supra note 200, at 819 (arguing that activity-inactivity distinction is not
supported by the text of The Commerce Clause); Barnett, supra note 214, at 431
(noting that many law professors have criticized the Court’s economicnoneconomic distinction drawn in Lopez and Morrison as arbitrary and
unrelated to the Constitution’s text); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 604 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a categorical rule prohibiting Congress from regulating
noncommercial activity is textually suspect considering that the Necessary and
Proper Clause authorizes Congress to enact all powers that are necessary and
proper).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see note 293.
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substantially relates to a larger scheme that regulates interstate
commerce, should be permissible under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.295
B. Implementation
Once there is a theoretical framework for the relationship between
the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause—the
Means-Ends Framework296—and a test that reflects that framework,297
the next step is to determine the best way to implement that test. First,
it is important to note that the Means-Ends Framework does not create
a bright-line rule. Due to the complexity of the issues and the
competing values involved, a measure of judicial discretion is
inevitable to find the proper balance between the principle of limited
powers and congressional flexibility to fix the means to reach its
enumerated ends. Furthermore, what means will effectively aid
Congress in its regulation of interstate commerce will inevitably
change over time with societal and technological developments.298 As
such, a bright-line rule is inappropriate in this context.
However, drawing from Professor J. Randy Beck’s work, The New
Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, this Article
proposes two major tools that the Court could use in applying the
Means-Ends Framework.299 The Court should examine (1) whether
Congress is really using an intrastate regulation to pursue an
enumerated end or if it is simply using that as a pretext to bring about
an end outside its authority,300 and (2) whether the regulation directly
supports an enumerated power, or if it only does so through “numerous

295
296
297
298

299
300

See text accompanying notes 257-60.
See supra beginning of Part IV.
See supra Part IV.A.
NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2629 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority’s decision striking down the mandate under the
Commerce Clause will “hem in Congress’s capacity to meet the new problems
arising constantly in our ever-developing modern economy”); see also
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819) (“[The Necessary and Proper
Clause] is . . . in a constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”).
Beck, supra note 19, at 612-13.
Id.; see infra Part V.B.1 (describing the application of this tool in more detail).
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intermediate or intervening causes.”301 The issues of “pretext” and
“directness” would ensure that the intrastate regulation is actually a
means to a larger regulation of interstate commerce, and that the
intrastate regulation substantially relates to that scheme.302
1. Pretext
An analysis of congressional motivations in enacting a regulation
of intrastate commerce would help the Court determine whether the
larger statutory scheme actually regulates interstate commerce and
whether the regulation of intrastate commerce is substantially related
to that scheme.303 When making this inquiry, the Court should
consider the regulation both objectively and subjectively; whether a
reasonable legislator would view the intrastate regulation as means to
bring about an enumerated end and whether the legislators who
enacted the law sincerely believed that the intrastate regulation would
bring about an enumerated end. This analysis ensures that, consistent
with the Means-End Framework, Congress is using the Necessary and
Proper Clause as a means to an enumerated power, not as a pretext to
reach an end outside out of its authority.

301

302

303

Beck, supra note 19, at 612-13; see infra PartV.B.2 (describing the application
of this tool in more detail). Beck also argues that a regulation under the
Necessary and Proper Clause must be “plainly adapted,” which he defines as a
regulation that does “not require a sophisticated explanation.” Beck, supra note
19, at 613. Such a requirement may be relevant in certain cases—if a
sophisticated explanation is needed to explain the many intervening causes that
connect the regulation to interstate commerce. However, the requirement sweeps
too broadly. Considering the growing complexity of society and technology, a
means may directly aid in an interstate regulation, but still require a
sophisticated explanation. See text accompanying note 298. As such, a
requirement that an intrastate regulation be “plainly adapted” to an enumerated
power, as Beck defines it, does not strongly serve the goals of the Means-Ends
Framework.
This is not meant to be an exhaustive list. Rather, it is illustrative of tools the
Court could use to help them analyze an intrastate regulation under the test
proposed in Part V.A. Other factors that the Court may want to consider when
applying the three-prong test include: how vital the intrastate regulation is to the
proper functioning of the interstate regulation, whether Congress considered
other less-intrusive means to reach the same the goal, and whether the intrastate
regulation aids in the functioning of a key part of the interstate regulation or
merely something peripheral to the overall scheme.
See supra Part V.A.2-3.
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The Court would first analyze whether a reasonable legislator
would view the intrastate regulation as likely to aid in a regulation of
interstate commerce.304 The Court frequently employs an objective
“reasonable person” analysis, making it a familiar tool for the Court to
apply in this context.305 The Court would examine the intrastate
regulation in relation to the larger economic scheme and ask, “would a
[reasonable] legislator who honestly wanted to achieve a legitimate
end within the scope of the enumerated powers really expect this
measure” to aid in the execution of that enumerated power?306 If the
answer is “yes,” then it is more likely that the regulation truly is a
means to an enumerated end, and that it is substantially related to that
end.307
Next, the Court should explore the actual subjective purpose of the
legislators who enacted the regulation and determine whether they
intended the intrastate regulation to be a means to a regulation of
interstate commerce or if the intrastate regulation was the end they
desired to achieve.308 While attempts to determine congressional
purpose have been criticized by some,309 it is a tool that the Court has

304
305

306
307
308

309

Beck, supra note 19, at 612.
See e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005) (applying a
reasonable person test to determine whether a picture of the Ten
Commandments in a county courthouse violated the establishment clause);
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991) (applying a reasonable person test
to determine whether a person has been seized under the Fourth Amendment);
Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501 (1987) (applying a reasonable person test to
determine whether a work has “serious literary, political, artistic, or scientific
value” when applying the Miller test for allegedly obscene material).
Beck, supra note 19, at 612.
See supra Part V.A.2-3.
Beck explicitly rejects an approach that would analyze the “subjective good
faith on the part of a large number of legislators.” Beck, supra note 19, at 612.
However, for the reasons set forth in this paragraph, I believe such an inquiry, in
addition to an objective analysis, may be useful in some cases.
See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 638 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that “discerning the subjective motivation of those enacting [a] statute
is . . . almost always an impossible task”); Robert Farrell, Legislative Purpose
and Equal Protection’s Rationality Review, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992)
(arguing that disagreement among the justices as to what constitutes “purpose”
has led to “an inconsistent and unpredictable body of case law”). But see
McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 861-62 (noting that courts frequently inquire into
the purpose of a government act and arguing that it must be a useful exercise,
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frequently used in other areas of the law.310 If Congress’s predominant
purpose was to regulate the intrastate activity and not interstate
commerce, then it is likely that the regulation of interstate commerce
does not predominate over the intrastate regulation.311 To determine
legislative purpose, the Court has considered factors such as the
legislative history of the statute312 and “the specific sequence of events
leading up to the challenged decision.”313 Despite the criticisms of
determining Congressional purpose, it would be an important tool in
some cases to help the Court determine whether the intrastate
regulation is genuinely being used as a means to an enumerated end.

310

311
312

313

otherwise “the whole notion of purpose in law would have dropped into
disrepute long ago”).
McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 861 (writing that “governmental purpose is a key
element of a good deal of constitutional doctrine”); City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 46-47 (2000) (writing that “courts routinely engage in [a
purpose inquiry] in many areas of constitutional jurisprudence as a means of
sifting abusive governmental conduct from that which is lawful”); see, e.g.,
McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 881 (finding that the government had a purpose to
promote religion based on the history of the plan to add a Ten Commandments
statute to a courthouse in violation of the Establishment Clause); Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (finding that
a facially neutral law that had a discriminatory effect on African Americans did
not have a discriminatory purpose and therefore did not violate the equal
protection); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)
(plurality opinion) (declaring that a provision regulating abortion is
unconstitutional “if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking abortion”).
See supra Part V.A.3.
Many judges, following the lead of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia,
refuse to look at the legislative history of a statute. Nicholas R. Parrillo,
Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative, The Judiciary, and
the Rise of Legislative History, 1890-1950, 123 YALE L.J 266, 269 (2013).
Justices who refuse to look at legislative history could still use the Means-Ends
approach and focus solely on the objective relationship between the statute and
an enumerated power and the context in which the bill was passed. See text
accompanying notes 304-07. Legislative history, while a useful tool in the
Means-Ends Framework, is not indispensable to its application. Therefore, this
approach can still be applied successfully by “textualist” judges.
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267. For example, in McCreary County, the town
first displayed a large Ten Commandments picture in its courthouse and then
changed the display two times to include other historical documents and the Ten
Commandments. 545 U.S. at 851-58. The Court held that the original display,
despite the subsequent changes, showed that the town had a purpose to endorse
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 873-74.
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2. Directness
To further help determine whether the intrastate regulation
substantially relates to the larger economic scheme,314 the Court
should also examine how directly the intrastate regulation aids in the
execution of the larger scheme.315 If the intrastate regulation only aids
the larger scheme through a chain of causation or through “numerous
intermediate or intervening causes,” then it is less likely that the
intrastate regulation is substantially related to the scheme.316 Since
“directness” is a term of degree, there is no bright-line rule to
determine how direct the connection between the means and end must
be to substantially relate.317 However, the more steps that are required
to show that the intrastate regulation supports the larger scheme, the
less likely it is permissible under the Necessary and Proper Clause.318
VI. CONCLUSION
Inquiries into “context” and “directness” are just two methods the
Court could use to apply the Means-Ends Framework to ensure that
the Necessary and Proper Clause provides only the means to the
execution of an enumerated power and not an additional end.319 Over
time, Congress’s commerce power has become its most expansive

314
315

316
317
318
319

See supra Part V.A.3.
See Beck, supra note 19, at 611-12. While the Court in Wickard clearly rejected
a distinction between regulations with direct and indirect effects on interstate
commerce, see text accompanying note 80, the Court’s holdings in Lopez and
Morrison, where it refused to “pile inference upon inference” to find a
connection between an intrastate regulation and interstate commerce, suggest
that the Court still considers relevant how direct the connection is between the
means employed and the enumerated end.
See Beck, supra note 19, at 612.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part V.A (laying out the three-prong test for the Means-Ends
Framework as (1) the regulation must be part of a larger statutory scheme that
predominates over the individual regulation; (2) the legislative scheme must
regulate interstate commerce; and (3) the regulation must substantially relate to
the goals of the economic scheme); see note 302 (describing other factors that
the Court might consider when applying the three-prong test of the Mean-End
Framework).
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power.320 Only by directly and explicitly addressing the Necessary and
Proper Clause can the scope of federal power be definitively
determined.321 The consistent tension in Commerce Clause cases has
been between giving Congress flexibility to address the problems of
the nation, while at the same time maintaining a federal government of
limited and enumerated powers.322 This dilemma provides no easy
bright-line solution and, like many other constitutional issues, will
often turn on a case-by-case determination.
The best way to make such a determination and to balance the
competing interests of flexibility and limited government is to focus on
the means-ends relationship between a particular regulation and a
larger economic scheme.323 The Commerce Clause refers only to direct
regulation of interstate commerce, and therefore congressional power
under that Clause should be limited to direct control of those issues.324
The Necessary and Proper Clause provides Congress flexibility to
select the means to meet its larger goals, but does not function as an
additional enumerated power.325 The Necessary and Proper Clause
imposes no limitations on what can be regulated, so long as it
“executes” an enumerated power.326 Thus the Court’s distinctions
between regulations of “activity and inactivity” and between
“economic and non-economic” regulations are unsupported by the
text.327
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Elizabeth Bondurant & Steven D. Henry, Constitutional Challenges to the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 249, 250 (2011);
Josie George Richardson, Note, Constitutional Law—Commerce Clause—Let
them Eat . . . Broccoli? 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 559, 585 (2013).
See Beck, supra note 19, at 581 (“Because the Necessary and Proper Clause
represents the outer boundary of congressional authority, consideration of this
provision necessarily illuminates discussions of state sovereignty and reserved
powers.”).
See supra Part II.A (describing the tension in McCulloch between the fact that
Congress is limited to its enumerated power and that Congress should have
significant leeway to pick the means to enforce those powers).
See supra Part V.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (giving Congress the power “to make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution” its enumerated
powers) (emphasis added).
See supra Parts IV.B.1, V.A.3.
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Recognizing that the Necessary and Proper Clause provides means,
and not an additional end in itself, its proper role should be in direct
aid of an enumerated power.328 As such, any intrastate regulation
should be upheld only if it is predominated by a larger economic
scheme and is substantially related to the regulation of interstate
commerce.329 This approach allows the Necessary and Proper Clause
to play its intended role of providing flexible means, without allowing
it to impermissibly extend congressional power to the functional
equivalent of a national police power.
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